Hamas Leader Killed: Unusual Common Ground for Brussels

By Andrea

Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar, the brain of October 7th, was killed by Israel this past week. For the first time, the EU seems to find a common ground on conflict-related affairs calling Sinwar a terrorist and declaring that there is now one less obstacle to the “necessary ceasefire” and the release of all hostages. Western leaders see indeed Sinwar’s death as an opportunity to push for a ceasefire. Both Joe Biden and Kamala Harris urged Israel to put an end to its military operations in Gaza. Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, went back to Israel on Monday to discuss the need for a ceasefire.



What hope is left? While the death of Hamas’ leader was celebrated by political elites in the West, others are using the image of his last moments as a symbol of resistance, which has strengthened the spirit of the cause. Not only, sources suggest that Hezbollah is preparing for an escalated confrontation with Israel. Therefore, hope still seems very far to reach.





After Gaza, Humanitarian Concerns for Lebanon and Syria
By Andrea

For the past month, Israel has continued its military operation against Hezbollah. Since then, at least 1,802 people have been killed across Lebanon. One quarter of the country is currently under Israeli evacuation orders and the Lebanese Government estimates that 1.2 million people are now displaced.



Coup de Grâce. Lebanon has endured wars, assassinations, corruption and nepotism, and neither the Lebanese people nor the government are in a position to withstand a new Israeli invasion.



The government is providing basic structures for shelter and aid distribution. However, a country that does not even have a president (yes, you read that right), cannot respond to such a humanitarian crisis within its borders. Ordinary Lebanese citizens are sharing their homes and resources, but solidarity will not be enough.



Displaced… once again. Over 200 thousand Syrians, who had previously sought refuge in Lebanon, have now crossed back to Syria causing a third humanitarian crisis in the region in just one year. Securing water, food, and shelter is becoming more difficult. International humanitarian organisations are struggling to meet the increasing needs of the displaced population.





Is the EU Considering Normalisation with Syria?

By Hafssa

Drastic times call for drastic measures. It’s official, Italy can’t wait for Brussels to mend ties with Syria. In July, it became the first G-7 and EU member to appoint an ambassador – Stefano Ravagnan – to Damascus after a 12-year rupture. For FM Antonio Tajani, the rationale is strategic; Italy no longer wants to leave the field open for Russia and its likes to monopolise the regional scene. Fair enough! But according to PM Giorgia Meloni’s raw and uncoated discourse, Rome might be more interested in irregular migration. Syria is a top departure country, and with the ongoing tension in the Levent, Meloni and her buddies worry European frontiers will get busy in the coming weeks.



Syria is safe, but for whom? Assessing Syria’s ‘safeness’ is not rocket science. The UN Commission of Inquiry and non-partisan organisations like the Syrian Network (SNHR) still document airstrikes, forced disappearances, displacement, and foreign interference. If this situation makes EU-Syria engagement a must, it entails that negotiations cannot start from refugee return. Syria is safe, but only for Assad, his clan and… for foreign vloggers.



Meloni is right though… The EU should review its Syria Strategy to add a sprinkle of pragmatism. Yet, Rome’s way of doing things risks emboldening the Assad regime. In 2023, Syria was readmitted into the Arab League despite concerns ranging from drug trafficking to refugee return. A year later, it is clear that Assad earned the currency he values the most – legitimacy – whereas Arab states ended up making concessions without obtaining much in return. Brussels should not follow the same steps.





New Elections, Old Leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan

By Michele

The 2024 parliamentary elections in Iraq’s Kurdish Independent Region (KIR) finally took place on October 21st, after being delayed for two years due todisagreements between the region's dominant parties, following the last elections in 2018. The main contenders were the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), linked to the Barzani family in Erbil, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), associated with the Talabani family in Sulaimaniyah. These parties have historically alternated in power, but the KDP has gained prominence over the past decade.



Key issues dominating the elections included the declining economy and rising unemployment, exacerbated by controversies with the central government in Baghdad over budget cuts affecting the autonomous region and disputes over oil revenues. Security concerns were also significant, particularly due to the presence of Turkish and Iranian-affiliated militias in the region. Additionally, corruption scandals involving resource appropriation and nepotism within both leading parties have contributed to a sense of disillusionment among the electorate. Many Kurds believe that the ongoing KDP-PUKantagonistic rivalry, which risked escalatingin recent years, undermines their representation at the national level, hindering effective advocacy for Kurdish interests in Baghdad.



For the KIR, the positive news is the unprecedented voter turnout: 72% compared to the 59% of 2018. The Kurdish regional parliament consists of 100 seats, operating under a proportional representation system and, although the complex process of assigning seats is still ongoing, preliminary estimates indicate that the KDP has achieved a strong lead with 39 seats. However, the KDP has not reached the absolute majority of 51 seats. The PUK follows with approximately 23 seats. Most notably, the opposition party New Generation Movement (NGM) emerged as a potential challenger, seeking to break the traditional KDP-PUK rivalry, and surprised many by nearly doubling its representation from 8 to 15 seats.



As the KDP strengthened its preexisting majority, no major shifts in regional dynamics are expected to come from these elections, as the party has historically maintained a moderate stance toward Türkiye and friendlier relations with the West. Moreover, the KDP’s victory balances Iranian influence in the country, as Teheran preferred to develop ties with the PUK.