You can cut it with a knife: tensions at the Lebanese-Israeli border

By Pablo

Fighting on two fronts. A day after Israel started the invasion of the Gaza Strip, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah fired rockets at Israeli army positions in the Shebaa Farms, a disputed terrain north of the Golan Heights. This territory is home to over 83,000 internally displaced people. This constituted another episode in the circle of violence confronting Hezbollah and the Israeli Army, and the situation is more alarming than ever given the ongoing war between Hamas and the Israeli state. However, despite these tensions, there are also reasons to believe that a fully-fledged war will not break out in the territory, since, given Lebanon and Israel’s diplomatic relations, they have more to win from verbal confrontation than a military one. Still, experts have described this situation as “A War in All But Name”.



Old friends. To give a bit of context, we could say that Hezbollah and Israel, well, they go waaay back. First, the increasing role of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics is intrinsically related to the invasion of Lebanon by the Israeli Defence Forces during the Lebanese civil war (1975-90). Additionally, Hezbollah acts as a satellite organization of the Iranian Revolution, which at the same time is an ally to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), now established in Beirut. Finally, Hezbollah’s stronghold is precisely south Lebanon, where most of the Shia population moved after the war. Because of previous frictions, a Blue Line had been drawn by the United Nations back in 2000, hoping to encourage the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. But after the start of the current hostilities, violations of the line have been reported. Again, this points to escalating tensions between the two powers, but it is still too early to expect a war to break out. What is clear is that these tense scenarios create the perfect conditions to overcome the accountability over human rights violations.





An icy wind blows over diplomatic relations between Mali and Algeria
By Laura

Taking the reins of the peace process. During his national speech on December 31, Assimi Goïta, president of Mali, declared his intention to prioritize national ownership of the peace process between his government and armed separatist groups in the North by launching a “direct inter-Malian dialogue for peace and reconciliation”.



A look back. In 2015, an Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation was signed by the Malian government and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). The CMA is a military coalition of Tuareg separatist groups that seek autonomy for the desert region of “Azawad” (in the northern Malian region of Kidal). The agreement was mediated by Algeria and seemed to cool down the conflict for half a decade, disarming the rebels and offering them integration into the Malian establishment. But tensions resurged following Goïta’s grab of power in 2021, and the withdrawal of the 10-years long UN peacekeeping mission MiNUSMA, that followed the end of the French military operation Barkhane in 2022, gave way to the violent clashes in the North since this summer.



What about Algeria? As Algeria’s south border collides with the Kidal region, it has clear interests in keeping the region safe and peaceful, and economically productive!. But now Algeria is being excluded from the peace process, and what is more, being blamed for interfering with Mali’s internal affairs by meeting the rebels without properly informing Bamako. Indeed, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune initiated new consultations with rebel groups and, on December 19, received the visit of Imam Mahmoud Dicko, an influential Malian religious leader and political dissident. Diplomatic relations between the two countries seem to be coming to a halt, with both ambassadors retreating to their respective countries.



Stop dividing. This case reveals the unquestionable interconnectedness between the Sahel and Maghreb territories, who are now looking with concerns at decision of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to withdraw from ECOWAS - the Economic community of West African States -, likely to spark further tensions and fragmentation both domestically and regionally.





Piano Mattei: Africa meets in Rome

By Luca

A new actor and guest stars. This week, Italy held the fourth international Italy-Africa Summit. Over 46 African countries and 25 multilateral bodies were present. The well-known, right-wing PM Giorgia Meloni, who often made Europe tremble and called for a naval blockade to halt migratory flows from Africa, unveiled the Piano Mattei, the new Italian initiative to relaunch the relations with the African continent under a “win-win” cooperation model. Not only Meloni. Guest stars were Queen VDL who clapped the Plan as in line with the EU Global Gateway - the EU infrastructural global plan that aims to mobilise up to 150 billion euros by 2027 in Africa. And also Roberta Metsola, the president of the European Parliament. Charles Michel was also there, but he is not really a start, innit? At least, in Brussels many think so.



Short dreams don’t come true. Education, health, agriculture, water and energy are the 5 key areas identified for cooperation. A shared programmatic platform, based on co-ownership, to redraw the paternalistic and neocolonial narratives on Africa by fostering sustainable development and efficient cooperation. Pilot projects have already started in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt and other 5 sub-Saharan countries. That sounds like a dream, and it’s worth only 5,5 billion euros. A short dream maybe, and African countries express their concerns on the limited budget of the Plan. But Italy’s soaring public debt up to 143% of the GDP does not leave much room, and all is now in the hands of Brussels, MSs and other non-Western donors and, of course, their degree of benevolence.





Blackmailing 101: After struggles, Türkiye approves Sweden’s NATO membership
By Hafssa

Good news in Stockholm. After 20 months of negotiations, the Turkish parliament has finally approved Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. President Erdoğan published the decree in the Official Gazette. Sweden and Finland had applied for NATO membership in 2022 following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an opportunity Türkiye took to exercise its best blackmail diplomacy. And while Finland managed to access the transatlantic alliance in April 2023, Sweden was left in limbo under Turkish veto. Sweden hadn’t been on Türkiye’s good side since it imposed an arms embargo on Ankara, following the latter’s incursion into Northern Syria. Additionally, Türkiye accusesthe Nordic country of providing a safe haven for ‘anti-Turkish groups’, namely the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Gülen movement, which Ankara deems responsible for orchestrating the 2016 coup.



Ankara’s wishes come true. In 2017, Ankara acquired Russian S-400 air defense systems, ignoring that the purchase would backfire[1] [2] . Turkish officials maintained that the decision was a matter of sovereignty, but for Washington the narrative was different: a NATO ally cannot operate on two fronts. Ankara started using the NATO card to exert pressure on the Congress to unfreeze the deal, and only then Washington approved the sale of $23 billion worth of F-16 fighter jets, missiles, and modernization kits. But, does this deal still hold the same value for Türkiye, years later? [3]



The hassle is not over. Sweden’s NATO membership is now in the hands of Hungary, and it is uncertain how negotiations will unfold. Prime Minister Viktor Orban alludes to a positive outcome, but he has not yet made clear demands to the Scandinavian state. The close relations of Budapest and Moscow, and its ambivalent stance towards the war in Ukraine may further hinder Stockholm’s accession to NATO.



Now, a bit of culture...

In this section, we uncover some of the most listened and watched musicians, writers or YouTubers of the MENA or new publications, articles or books either from or on the region. If you have any suggestions, you’re always welcome to tell us via our email!



Unpacking Gulf geopolitics. In 2011, the fall of the Benali and Mubarak regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and the persistence of regionwide protests wobbled Gulf states. With the subsequent eruption of civil wars to COVID-19 and the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Gulf states have been playing a protagonist role in reshaping the regional scene and balancing stability with security imperatives.

If you are interested in finding out more about the topic, you can check out Cinzia Bianco’s book, The Gulf Monarchies after the Arab Spring: Threats and Security, fresh from the press! The book dives into all six Gulf monarchies to explore policy-making in a post-Arab Spring order characterized by disorder, volatility, and uncertainty. It is the product of eight years of research, and it is a must-read for academics, students, and anyone who wishes to understand threat perceptions and geopolitical calculations in the Gulf.